# Very bad R.R. accident in Chatsworth, CA



## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

Just turned on the news here and we have a very serious MetroLink/freight train accident here in So Cal. Reports of at least 6 killed and could be as many as 30. News is still sketchy.


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## San Juan (Jan 3, 2008)

It is just an awful scene and there are several fatalities. It might end up being Metrolink's worse wreck. 

I'd hate to speculate this early, but I think Metrolink may have ran a signal or the signals were not operating properly. 

This Map shows where the collision took place. If you pan down (south) a bit you will see where the line goes from double tracks down to a single track due to the tunnels just to the northwest. Metrolink had just left Chatsworth and was heading North. UP was heading south. The wreck occurred close to the signals where Metrolink would have been held. UP may have also ran a signal, but this is northwest and far from the wreck site. 

The Coast Starlight and other trains will obviously be disrupted for several days. 

Terrible tragedy. I'm praying for those whose families may be affected by this. 

For more information, below is a good link that appears to be updating: 

Metrolink Collision


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## Semper Vaporo (Jan 2, 2008)

That came close to being IN the tunnel!


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

If you look on Google Earth, you can see that the collision probably took place on the long sweeping curve just west of Canoga Avenue and just north of Rinaldi street. There is a short tunnel just to the west of the collision point. There are double tracks just south of the collision point.


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

According to reports as of 6:00 am PDT, this is the worst passenger train accident in the U.S. in fifteen years. 17 killed and 135 injured-85 critical according to the Medical Director of Los Angeles Fire Department. Local reports this morning says that they are still removing victims.


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## vsmith (Jan 2, 2008)

Several things should not have happened, two trains one track, but the engine telescoped the lead car, THAT should never have happened in this day and age, I thought the cars were engineered to prevent that? Terrible.


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## Torby (Jan 2, 2008)

Report just now that they see more bodies they haven't retrieved. Apparently the commuter train passed a red signal.


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## Greg Stevens (Jan 3, 2008)

Unfortunate final death count is 25. I don't know how many were injured, but the last I heard was over 100. The dead included one LAPD Ofcr who was off duty and enroute home. She was only 35 yrs old and had just started a new job down town. They are saying that the cause was the Metrolink engineer using his cell phone for texting messages and he ran through a red block signal just prior to the crash. My condolences go to the families of all of those who lost loved ones in this deadly crash.


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## Esppe Pete (Jan 21, 2008)

condolencenes to all Involved in this trajady. Especially for the 4 crew members of the UP in the Evolution headed freight train. 

If you know the topography in this are all rail fans knew it was the Metrolink engineer who blew it and paid with his and his passengers lives. 

The UP Mixed Frieght was heading Southbound traveling DOWNHILL from the Summit. We all know that you don't stop a frieght train comming downhill. I belive The metrolink was in the hole and came out against a red signal. 

The speeds involved were not that high but the Kinetic energy behind the mass of the UP frieght coming downhill is what drove the Metrolink engine into her first passanger car and where most of the fatalities occured. The impact point was probably 100+ feet uphill from where they came to rest. With the mass of the Frieght plowing downhill into the Metrolink. 

Ridership was at an all time high in So Cal due to fuel prices which are some of the Highest in the nation. 
We desperately need double track from Santa Barbara to San Diego to prevent these accidents and handle frieght traffic. 

Pete


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## Paul Burch (Jan 2, 2008)

Any chance they would reroute the Coast Starlight over Tehachapi?


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

My wife just learned that a fellow teacher she taught with about thirteen years ago was one of those killed. Also a counselor at one of the high schools in Glendale was injured. Hits close to home now.


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

Paul, 

I've heard that the line should be open later tonight or early tomorrow.


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## San Juan (Jan 3, 2008)

Paul, 
No reroute planned for the Starlight. 

It's current southern terminus is Santa Barbara. Buses will transport passengers to and from Los Angeles to Santa Barbara. 

Intermediate stops such as Oxnard will likely be served by another bus. That's what they did when I took it and the line had just washed out that day due to heavy rains. 

And as Gary stated, they are working fast and furious to reopen the line. 

UPDATE 
Here is the official Amtrak announcement: 

Starlight


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## Randy Stone (Jan 2, 2008)

Hi 

In this day and age of electronics, I don't understand why the railroads don't have electronic control of the trains as they travel. My understanding of this accident is that the Metrolink passed two yellow lights before it ignored a red light and ended up on the same track as a UP Frt. 

Why couldn't the train have had a system that warned the engineer of the Metrolink of each Yellow with the engineer having to ackowledge each yellow. This would have verified the engineer was alive and present in the cab. If there was no ackowledgement from the engineer, the system could have shut down the motors I set the brakes. Even if the engineer had ackowledged both yellows, running the red light should have det the system to not only stop the metrolink, but send an emergency message to the UP Freight 

Sure a systemlike this would be expensive, but how much will the 25 dead customers of the Metrolink cost?


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## Esppe Pete (Jan 21, 2008)

Saturday 7:15pm Coast Starlight Just went through Ventura. Line is Open. 

Pete


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## Mike Reilley (Jan 2, 2008)

There are systems that do what you suggest...and they are uniformly hated. When these systems have an error, they apply the train brakes. Unfortunately, they can do that on a hill and stall a train so that it wouldn't be able to restart. Or, they can stop it while it's in a metro area...and block many intersections. They sometimes don't reset...and the brakes stay locked and the engineer can't get the train moving again. Like I said...uniformly hated. 

The way this is supposed to work is that the engineer AND the conductor are BOTH supposed to call out the signals on their radios to each other. Further, trains have an enuciator in the cab that the engineer has to push about every minute. That tells the engine that he's still alive. If he doesn't push the button, the train applies the brakes. 

The conductor lived. The engineer didn't. As this unfolds, the conductors story should prove interesting as the train passed two yellows and a red. Lastly, the UP freight had a crash camera...so the whole crash is recorded and is in the hands of the NTSB. Should make good YouTube viewing in less than a month.


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## San Juan (Jan 3, 2008)

Posted By rlvette on 09/14/2008 7:21 PM
Hi 
In this day and age of electronics, I don't understand why the railroads don't have electronic control of the trains as they travel. 




As far as a system you describe, well it's in place on the former Santa Fe San Diegan route. And all Metrolink locomotives are setup for this system since they run this route. The system in place is Automatic Train Stop (ATS). But this is only there because the Santa Fe wanted to run trains over 79mph. The Interstate Commerce Commission mandated some form of train control for speeds over 79mph in 1947. Thanks to this, ATS is still in effect on many former Santa Fe districts. 

However the collision took place on a former Southern Pacific line. No form of train control was ever installed, and to this day remains that way. How long this lasts is anyone's guess after this tragedy. Typical that it takes a tragedy to educate the public and government that systems do exist that could eliminate or at least reduce the possibility of running signals. 

But ATS is not the most effective system out there, and (without going into the complexities of how ATS works) I doubt it would have prevented this horrible accident. 

And Mike, unlike this video, I seriously doubt the video will ever be released to the public. Unless I missed your sarcasm


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## DKRickman (Mar 25, 2008)

As others have said, there are ATS and PTC (positive train control) systems in place in many areas. However, the cost of implimenting them on every single piece of track in use would be astronomical, and even the cost involved in 25 deaths would pale by comparison. For those that would argue such systems are only needed on passenger carrying routes, look at the devastation caused by the wreck in Graniteville, SC. I can think of may other wrecks that have demolished town, taken lives, and yet involved no passenger trains. 

Also, as has been pointed out, the systems are not foolproof. Ignoring for the moment the hassles caused by false activations, they require a certian length of time to act. If an engineer is ****-bent on running past a signal, or is for some reason incapacitated, the train can very easily still end up on the wrong side of the signal. If there also happens to be another train out there at precisely the wrong moment, this is what happens. 

Don't misunderstand me, please. As an engineer, I would love to see a system that improves my chances of going home at night. But I also understand the simple economics of the situation. Maybe the public pressure from this tragedy will change things. As I understand, there are now signals being installed on the line through Graniteville. Of course, the cold hearted part of me wonders if it's really worth it to do EVERYTHING in our power to prevent a death. At some point, doesn't the cost outweight the benefit? Like I said, I kinda like living, and I would like to think that I'm guaranteed to come home to my wife, but I accept that I may be the one to draw the short staw and save the railroad the cost of some safety equipment. 

Kinda macabre, isn't it? Sorry about that. I offer my condolences to all those affected by this tragedy, and my personal pledge to do whatever I can to prevent it happening to any train I'm on.


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## joe rusz (Jan 3, 2008)

KCBS (Channel 2 in LA) reported tonight (Tuesday) that the feds renacted the crash with two freight locos and one Metro engine, checked sight distances and such and found that the freight engineer had four seconds to respond, which he did, hitting the emergency braking button in two secs. The Metrolink engineeer never braked. He also blew throug the switch just downstream of the collision siite. The question is why? It will be interesting to see what the autoposy shows. Still, a very tragic and sobering event. BTW, the lady PR person for Metrolink, who announced to the press almost immediately after the crash, that it was their fault, got fired for speaking out of turn.


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

Actually the Metrolink spokeswoman was NOT FIRED, she was "asked" to resign. Whatever that means. Apparently the Board for Metrolink were in disagreement as to when to announce the early findings. Most legal experts believe that the dollar amount for the upcoming lawsuits would more than pay for a high-tech warning system that would have prevented this accident.


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## gregcoit (Jan 2, 2008)

Posted By gary Armitstead on 09/16/2008 11:09 PM
Most legal experts believe that the dollar amount for the upcoming lawsuits would more than pay for a high-tech warning system that would have prevented this accident.




I'm not sure that the "high-tech warning system", called (I think) Positive Train Control (PTC) would have prevented the accident. 

My limited understanding is this. The engineer seems to have ignored 2 yellows and a red signal. A yellow in this case (remember, I said I had limited understanding) I think means that you should be ready and capable of stopping at the next signal (if that red signal is red) - this does not necessarily mean a reduction in speed. Hence, would the PTC have slowed the train as a result of the yellow signals? I don't know. 

Now, as for the red signal, the PCT would have kicked in *after* the engineer passed it. At this point, the accident was a done deal. Yes, the PCT could have lessened the number of injuries and deaths by decreasing the speed of the metrolink train at the time of the headon, but the metrolink train would have certainly still fouled the main in this scenario. 

My opinion is that the money would be *much* better spent on manpower. Here's my reasoning: 

From what I can gather from the newspaper, there were 2 metrolink employees on the train - the engineer in the cab and the conducter in one of the passenger cars. These 2 were supposed to communicate by radio to each other confirmation of the signal colors. There's evidence of this communication occuring for all signals with the exception of the 2 yellows and red. The papers seem to indicate that the conductor and engineer didn't communicate at all about the last 3 signals (my understanding is that the conductor has been interviewed but I've not read anything about what was said). This could be attributed to radio troubles or the conductor being busy helping passengers. 

This is where another person in the cab would have made all the difference. He would have called out all 3 signals to the engineer and expected a verbal response to each one. it would have been visually obvious to him that the engineer was distracted. And the second person on the cab would have had an emergency brake button if the engineer didn't respond to seeing the red signal. This very well could have stopped the train *before* it fouled the main and there would have been no accident. 

Plus, money spent on staff helps the economy in much better ways than money spend on tech (IMHO). 

For the record, I'm not a Luddite. I do tech support for a local ISP, and I'm the president of the local Lunix Users Group. I just feel, in this case, that tech is not the answer. 

Greg Coit 
Arcata, CA


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## Semper Vaporo (Jan 2, 2008)

I do agree with you that more people in the cab is "better", but not long ago THREE people in the cab missed a red signal and caused a head-on crash. 

I have thought that maybe a lineside device might help... such as a "gate", similar to a highway crossing gate, that drops across the track... maybe flimsy, but of a material that would make enough noise in the train to attract attention. I know that in some countries on some lines the trains have to actually stop and move a gate manually, but I am thinking of an automated system that works in conjuction with the lights to present a physical barrier (however easily overcome) to the passage of the train. 

Maybe even a device that would warn any oncomming traffic of the opposing train having passed the signal/barrier.


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## Bill Swindell (Jan 2, 2008)

They could have prevented this with "automatic train stop." It will cut power and apply emergency brakes when the engine tries to pass a red signal. 

There is no excuse for this type of accident. I am sorry the engineer died but I feel much worse for the families of the passengers who died. 

Banning the use of cell phones for except railroad related business is OK but banning them completely is wrong. Some times you need to use the cell phone to conduct proper business like calling the dispatcher when the don't answer the radio.


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## gregcoit (Jan 2, 2008)

Posted By Bill Swindell on 09/17/2008 1:33 PM
They could have prevented this with "automatic train stop." It will cut power and apply emergency brakes when the engine tries to pass a red signal.




Really? This technology sense when a train is approaching a red signal and applies the brakes so that the train stops *before* the red signal? It would surprise me if it works that way. 

More likely (again, I'm not an expert), it knows that a train has passed a red signal and applies the brakes. This is a *very* different situation because this would not have prevented the accident. Based on where most signals are in relation to the end of sidings, applying the brakes at the signal would have only slowed the train as it ploughed through the switch (which was thrown against it) and fouled the main. Based on how little time the UP freight crew had, the freight (which was heading downhill) still would not have been able to stop. 

Greg Coit 
Arcata, CA


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## aceinspp (Jan 2, 2008)

Human error accidents are up. You can apply all the technology but people need to pay attention If we can cure human error then derailment will decrease. Cell phone are not necessity for RR as Radios do quite well and when communications are interrupted then the safe course is taken till communications is reestablished. ATS is only required where track speed are over 79 and now regulated by the FRA. The RR rules state that one must be alert at all times this means no reading of news papers sleeping or texing on a cell phone. 

If there had been a another head end person then probably this accident could have been prevented. I spent 31 years investigating RR accidents and some of the mistakes made would amaze you. Later RJD


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## Bill Swindell (Jan 2, 2008)

It is used between LA and San Diego now. If nothing else, it would have reduced the closing speed between the 2 trains by 42 MPH. It's not perfect but is is available NOW and would have helped. Also, the stopping device and signal could be placed further from the fouling point of the switch and have stopped the train in time.


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## aceinspp (Jan 2, 2008)

Well if you can get the FRA rules changed then they can relocate the signals. In a year you can get the NTSB report and see what there final recommendation is. Later RJD


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

I had to reduce this photo to get it on this site. But this is from Google Earth. Yiu can plainly see the tunnel portal at the upper left hand corner, the sweeping curve where the collision occurred(location point is at the grassy area to the north of the curve)and the switch and signal at the extreme bottom of the photo. That was the RED signal and switch he went through. This engineer passed TWO Yellow signals to the south of this signal leaving Chatsworth station, probably less than a mile away.


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## Esppe Pete (Jan 21, 2008)

The more you here about this accident the more I think the Metrolink Engineer was dead at the controls or he committed suicide. THis could have been an even worse if the trains colloied inside the tunnel which was only a few hundered yards to the north. All of that frieght train mass plowing into passanger cars with latteral energy release, Fire, no light, smoke, no escape! 

Like 9/11 and the World trade center which was populated by 60,000+ workers and the subsequent mortality rate, we can be thankful for some mercy.


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## vsmith (Jan 2, 2008)

http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=CNuzZI-7h4U&feature=related 

Heres an eye opener, cab camera of the accident sight, it begins right where the track converge, you can see the signal, this is where the Metrolink forced the points, from here you can see how tight the curve is and how little time one could react to something ahead. 

The more I think about it the more I wonder if the engineer hasnt trying to pick his phone up off the floor and never saw it coming


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## gregcoit (Jan 2, 2008)

Posted By Esppe Pete on 09/17/2008 9:03 PM
The more you here about this accident the more I think the Metrolink Engineer was dead at the controls or he committed suicide.




I'm pretty sure that Metrolink trains have "alerters" which means the train goes into emergency if the engineer fails to push a button every so often (I don't know the time interval). Very doubtful the guy was incapacitated - he was just not paying attention to the track and signals. Most likely he was just pushing the alerter button as reflex while he was texting or whatever he was doing 

As for the guy who suggested gates at every signal - there are 100 if thousands of signals in this country. Much better (and cheaper) to install something in each loco (which will actually stop a train) rather than each signal (which has no chance of stopping a train). 

Greg Coit 
Arcata, CA


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## Gary Armitstead (Jan 2, 2008)

Latest report from KNBC 4 in Burbank was that the Metro engineer was diabetic (I'm a diabetic and it could be possible low blood sugar at the time). Also he had a man jump in front of his engine and commit suicide about a month before this accident. The interview that investigators had with the Metro conductor reported that the conductor and engineer had not communicated at all during the last two yellow signals before the red. That YouTube that Vic posted was taken about the same time of day as the accident and you can see how close that switch and signal are to the collision point.


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## Jim Francis (Dec 29, 2007)

Perhaps they could take a step back in time to find a possible solution: 

When the Key System and the Sacramento Northern used the lower deck of the Bay Bridge to get to the San Francisco terminal, they needed a positive means of stopping trains if the train "passed" a red signal. 

Each car had it air brake line routed to a point on the roof (in two places) that led to a glass tube. 

Each signal was equipped with a short stiff "arm" similar to a semiphore that would extend out when the signal changed to "RED" such that it would break the glass tube if the train passed the signal; releasing the air and stopping the train. 

The train would be unable to move again until the glass tube was replaced and the brake system recharged with air. 

That would be a lot more dependable than an electronic system - but would likely tick off the RR because of the attendant time delays in moving the offending train(s). 

There would be no hiding for offending engineers/operators. 

Jim


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## Torby (Jan 2, 2008)

Seems extreme to me. 

How 'bout if a computer voice were to shout, "Hey dummy! You blew a signal!" 

http://www.outsidetrains.com/mls/heydummy.wav


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## Sesh1975 (Aug 25, 2008)

Heres a response I found on another website. 


"So maybe a little background on Rob is in order. Rob started his career with Amtrak up here, he hired out in Oakland, came from the midwest, St. Louis I recall. In any case, he trained up here, then went down to LA, and went over to Metrolink. In those days, Metrolink was staffed by Amtrak engineers, and when Amtrak lost the contract, the vast majority of Amtrak engineers working there opted to resign from Amtrak and be retained by Metrolinks new outside contractor. Rob was one of those. He was long gone from Oakland when I got up here, rather, I knew him from my UP days as I talked and laughed with him as he ran the UP line to Riverside. Nice guy, really, always had a good joke. 
Forensic, when I posted the thread up, it was in no way meant to be offensive to the many innocent victoms of the crash, rather, to pay homage to a guy who, aside from one terrible, bad moment, was a steller, talented engineer. As good as they come. If I offended you in any way, I appologize. It was not my intent. 
Obviously, a lot of changes are coming to my workplace as a result of this, and the stress is getting higher out there. The obvious, immediate ones obviously deal with cell phone use, as well as others in the works. 
Now the incident itself. Some of you guys are wondering what did happen?? Well, here is what we are hearing from sources we have. 
Metrolink 111 made a station stop at Chatsworth, we all know that. then three minutes later all **** broke loose. The scenario is this. Every train when they are going to be stopped, go through a process of being stopped. That process looks like this.... 
1. Approach Medium= Proceed, do NOT pass next signal exceeding 40mph unless it can be seen that next signal is either clear or another Approach meduim...(this signal is a proceed signal, you can do track speed as long as you have this signal or BETTER, i.e. GREEN. 
2. Approach=Proceed not exceedign 40 MPH to next signal prepared to stop BEFORE any part of engine or train passes signal. I.E. do 40 looking for and expecting a red at the next signal. 
3. Red= STOP. Period. 
One last term, before we look at the scenario is a term called "Delayed in the block." Simply stated, it means it your train at ANY time, regardles of signal indication, stops or drops to a speed less than 10mph, upon resumption of speed, you are limited to 40mph until you can CLEARLY, and the operative word here is CLEARLY see the next signal, if a proceed signal, you may resume max speed. OKAY, now lets talk about 111. 
According to the tapes, and to clarify this, ALL conversations are recorded on the railroad. All of them. Metrolinks are recorded at their dispatch center in Montclair, UP and BNSF are recorded at the command center in San Bernadino, where K26 sits and plays God all day. Back to the tapes. According to them, Rob called out all signals, including deprture signals, i.e. "we are leaving the station working on a clear" except for the last two, of course the two most importand of the day. He did not call out the approach medium, or the approach, and he did not call out the departure signal. Hmmmm...why?? That is a sticking point in the investigation, the easy thing is to say he was texting, but it does not cover the large amount of lapsed time. And, where was the conductor??? 
--->> On a passenger train, the engineer AND the conductor are JOINTLY responsible for the safety of the train and it's passengers, with all ultimate control and authority given to the conductor, NOT the engineer. So where was he? Rule states that ANY siganal less favorable that a clear block MUST be called out to the conductor over the radio, and the conductor must acknowledge the signal. I.E. ... 
"Metrolink 111, approach medium, milepost 235.6, over. " 
"Metrolink 111, approach medium, milepost 235.6, thank you, out. " 
For the last two signals, that conversation apparently did not happen, I think it did, but I could be wrong. And, this conversation did not get recorded either. 
"Metrolink 111, highball Chatsworth..." 
"Metrolink 111, highball Chatsworth, departure on an appraoch, over. " 
"On an approach, thank you sir, out" 
So where was the conductor?? Where was his situational awareness?? Why did he not call up to the engineer and ASK him the signal?? Or if he knew what it was, why did he not place the train in emergency?? It was his job to be aware of all of that, and he failed...he was uniquely able to stop the accident from happening, and he didn't. At this point, he in the hospital with two broken legs, trying hard not to answer the hours of questions coming his way from the NTSB, FRA, Metrolink, and UP, and God knows who else. You know the rest. 
Now back to "delayed in the block." There has been a RAGING debate in rail circles over which rule governed thier departure out of Chatsworth, the Yellow Approach indication, or "delayed in the block." Because they stopped the train, delayed in the block DOES come into play, right? Wrong. Heres why. Had they had a previous signal of an approach medium or better, they could have taken off not exceeding 40 till they could plainly see the next signal. But they were not, they were on an approach, meaning the next signal WILL be red, do not pass it. Appoach, being the more restrictive rule, trumps delayed in the block, in this case. Both men should have known that. For sure the conductor should have. I will be eager to hear his story. Also, after discussing this with a couple of Amtrak rulies,and more than a few BNSF and Amtrak road Foreman, we have all come to the same conclusion, that the Delayed in the block rule is hybrid form of restricted speed, the operative word in the definition being "exceed". RS carries the same wording, though it is "exceeding""


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## vsmith (Jan 2, 2008)

Does anyone know how long does it take between alerter signals, and how long before a un-aknowledged alerter signal activates the brakes? 

I ask because I was unaware the engineer was diabetic, I occured to me, if he had just reset the alerter, then had a sudden case of insulin shock and was incapacitated and he blacked out, and this was just prior to the train approaching the signal block, if he couldnt react to the red signal to slow the train down and it rolled thru the switch and almost immediatly into the UP frieght, was all this possible in the time frame between the alerter resets?


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## Snoq Pass (Jan 2, 2008)

Posted By vsmith on 09/18/2008 9:03 AM
Does anyone know how long does it take between alerter signals, and how long before a un-aknowledged alerter signal activates the brakes? 





I have heard that the dead man's switch alarm goes off every 30secs.


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## DKRickman (Mar 25, 2008)

Posted By vsmith on 09/18/2008 9:03 AM
Does anyone know how long does it take between alerter signals, and how long before a un-aknowledged alerter signal activates the brakes?

On NS, it varies depending on the locomotive, but I've had alerters that go off anywhere from 20 to 45 seconds, unless reset by: 
Hitting the alerter whisker; 
Moving the throttle; 
Blowing the horn; 
Applying the automatic brake; 
Bailing off the indipentand brake 

Some of these do not apply to some locomotives. Also, if the automatic brake were applied already (or, heaven forbid, cut out) the alerter would not do anything at all. 

As for how long it takes, that depends on a couple things. First is the time that the alerter is going off - this is usually about 20-30 seconds, I believe, thought I've not timed it myself. At the end of that time, the brake is immediately applies, the power cut, and the stop is made as quickly as possible. That can still take some time, depending on the weight and speed of the train.


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